Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph R. Fox; Attorney for Appellant.
Thomas L. Kay; Ray, Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, No. 890407 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2008
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
A. *s 0 
DOCKET riO. 
IN THE SUPRIiME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN FIBERGLASS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHKELL, 
a p r o f e s s i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n , 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t . 
I l l Nto4 880032 
.IE11' OF|| APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JJ1&Y VERDIGffi ffAKEV BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGiS OF THE THIRD I> [STRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, UTAH. 
THOMAS L. KAY 
Attorney for Respondent 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City. Utah, 
b^EPH R. FOX 
tfcorney for Appellant 
160 South 300 West 
bhdy, Utah 84070 
If8™! 
h u 
«•-• " J " 
JUL2 21988 
"clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN FIBERGLASS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant : 
vs. : 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL, : 
a professional corporation, 
De fendant-Respondent. 
Appeal No. 880032 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JURY VERDICT TAKEN BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGE OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, UTAH. 
THOMAS L. KAY 
Attorney for Respondent 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
JOSEPH R. FOX 
Attorney for Appellant 
9160 South 300 West 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
T . .... 
TABLE OF CONTENTS <-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . 3 
JURISDIOTK/,! . , , , 4 
NATURE PF PROCEEDINGS 4 
ISSUF ' • A 
STATEMENT . ; ' A. : . . 
FACTS RELEVANT " APPEAL 
; ;..- ' '. . v 
ARGUMENr ') 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Acculog Inc. v. Keith Peterson, 692 P2d 728 11 
Degan v. Steinbeck, 142 N.E. 2d 328 11 
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P2d 894 14 
George v. Caton, 600 P2d 822 11 
Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P2d 1238 10 
Kane, Kane & Kritzer v. Altager, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 11 
Practical Offset v. Davis, 404 N.E. 2d 516 11 
Theobold v. Byers v. 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 11 
Statutes 
U.C.A. 78-27-38 10 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence 14 
Rule 613, Utah Rules of Evidence 13, 14 
Other Authorities 
R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice, 2nd Ed. 1981 10 
87 A.L.R. 2nd 991 11 
^ 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (i) as this is an appeal from a 
final judgment and order in a civil matter of the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County/ State of Utah. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff brought an action against the defendant law firm 
for negligence in representing its interests in the sale of 
certain manufacturing equipment. 
A jury trial was held beginning December 1, 1987 and 
concluding December 9, 1987. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the 
plaintiff appeals to recover its damages and for a new trial. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the jury's finding that the plaintiff was 50% 
negligent was proper. 
2. Whether the jury was justified in reducing the damages 
from that stated in the evidence where no evidence of mitigation 
or reduction was offered by the defense. 
3. Whether the exclusion of evidence of what the plaintiff 
could have done had it been properly advised of its rights under 
paragraph 6.03 of the contract was prejudicial error. 
4. Whether the exclusion of prior statements of a witness 
who testified at the trial was prejudicial error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant law 
firm to recover damages for negligence of its attorney's in 
representing its interest in the sale of certain manufacturing 
equipment to a firm known as Untied Fiberglass. 
The basis of the plaintiff's claim was that the defendant 
failed to file the appropriate financing statements to perfect 
its security in the accounts receivable of United Fiberglass, and 
that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff that its rights 
to retake possession of the equipment in the event of United 
Fiberglass's default was subject to a lien of Sovran Bank, which 
took a secured position in the equipment as collateral for the 
purchase price. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appeals on the 
grounds set forth below. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL 
In 1982 plaintiff was a manufacturer of fiberglass 
insulation. (RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, pages 27-32, and Vol. 3 of 6 
days, pages 29 and 35). 
Ivan Radman was the president of plaintiff and the person 
who represented the the plaintiff in the transactions giving rise 
to matters now pending before the court. (RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, 
page 22, and Vol. 3 of 6 days, page 35). 
Neither the plaintiff nor Ivan Radman had any prior 
experience in buying or selling equipment where part of the 
purchase price was deferred and payment secured by accounts 
receivable of the purchaser. (RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, pages 25-
26, 30, 34-35, 37-38, and Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 43-45 and 114-
115) . 
Plaintiff contracted in January 1983 for the sale of certain 
fiberglass manufacturing equipment to a Virginia Firm known as 
United Fiberglass (OR. Exhibit 11; and RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, 
pages 39-48, 72, 82). 
Plaintiff employed defendants1 attorneys to represent and 
protect its interests in the negotiations and closing of the 
contract (Vol. 1 of 6 days, pages 51-59, and 66; Vol 2 of 6 
days, pages 3; Vol. 3 of 6 days pages 134, 139, 140-141; and Vol. 
5 of 6 days, pages 133-134). 
The contract provided for deferred payments of a portion of 
the purchase price, which payments were to be secured by the 
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass (Exhibit 11, paragraph 
2.03; RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, page 86-87). 
The defendant attorneys failed to inform or advise the 
plaintiff or its agents of the need to file financing statments 
in order to perfect its security interests in the accounts 
receivable of United Fiberglass (OR. Exhibit 83; RT. Vol. 2 of 6 
days, pages 12-15; Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 161-162; and Vol. 4 of 
6 days, pages 34-37, 75-76, and 79). 
Defendant attorneys, knowing of the need to file financing 
statements, did not cause such statement to be filed covering the 
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass (RT. Vol. 1 of 6 days, 
page 34; Vol. 3 of 6 days, pages 99-100, 156-165; and Vol. 4 of 6 
days, pages 29-31, and 140). 
The contract provided, further, at paragraph 6.03, that in 
the event of default by United Fiberglass, the plaintiff would 
have the right to retake possession of its equipment ( OR. 
Exhibit 11, paragraph 6.03; and RT. Vol. 2 of 6 days, pages 4-8). 
Although the evidence was in dispute whether Mr. Radman was 
informed that the plaintiff's right to take back the equipment 
was subject to the liens of Sovran Bank, the Court excluded 
testimony of R. Bailie which would have supported the plaintiff's 
contention that the plaintiff was not so informed (RT. Vol. 4 of 
6 days, pages 32, 51, and Vol. 5 of 6 days, pages 63-64). 
The only other evidence of whether the plaintiff was 
informed that its rights to take back the equipment under 6.03 
were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank, was the self serving 
statements of Dwight Williams (RT. Vol. 4 of 6 days, pages 85-87, 
101-105) . 
Further, the Court refused to allow Mr. Radman to testify 
regarding what could have been done to modify the agreement to 
protect the equipment had he known that the plaintiff's rights to 
retake possession were subject to the liens of the bank (RT. Vol. 
3 of 6 days, pages 27-28). 
During the period between September 1984 and February 1985, 
the accounts receivabtle of United Fiberglass which were not 
subject to a prior lien by Sovran Bank ranged between $190,000.00 
and $240,000.00 (OR. Exhibits 116 and 117; RT. Vol. 5 of 6 days, 
pages 22-28 and 54). 
In response to the special verdict, the Jury found that the 
defendant had a duty to perfect a security interest in the 
accounts receivable on behalf of the plaintiff; that the 
defendant breached that duty to the plaintiff; and that the 
plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $84,000.00 (RT. Vol. 6 
of 6 days, page 79-82). 
The Jury found, also, that the plaintiff was 50% negligent 
in the damages thus assessed (RT. Vol. 6 of 6 days, page 81). 
Further, the Jury found that the defendant had a duty to 
advise the plaintiff that it rights under paragraph 6.03 of the 
contract were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank; and that the 
defendants had not breached that duty (RT. Vol. 6 of 6 days, page 
81 and 82) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Jury should not have found the plaintiff 50% negligent 
with regard to the failure to file the financing statements over 
the accounts receivable of United Fiberglass. The Courts cited 
have consistently held that a client may not be contributor ily 
negligent with regard to matters entrusted to their attorney, 
where there are not facts of interference or failure to follow 
instructions on behalf of the client. 
The breach of duty in failing to file the financing 
statements was so clear that as a matter of law the attorney was 
negligent, and the plaintiff did nothing to interfere with or 
contribute to the fact that the financing statements were not 
filed. 
The defense did not put on any evidence to reduce or 
mitigate the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Those damages 
were measured by the level of accounts receivable during the 
period between September 1984 and February 1985. Having found 
that the defendants negligent for failing to file the financing 
statements, the Jury should have found that the evidence was 
uncontradicted that the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the 
sum of approximately $200,000.00. 
The trial court erred in excluding the statements of R. 
Bailie with regard to conversations with, and affidavits given to 
the plaintiff, qualifying his deposition testimony regarding the 
plaintiff's knowledge of its rights under 6.03. The strongest 
evidence in this regard in favor of the defendant was the 
testimony of Bailie and Williams. Because Bailie was a 
disinterested witness, his testimony was critical the plaintiff, 
and its exclusion was detrimental. 
The trial court erred in excluding evidence of what the 
plaintiff could have done had it known the true import of 6.03. 
An essential element of the plaintiff cause of action was how it 
would have benefited had the attorney advised it properly. Since 
this element was excluded by the Court, the plaintiff was denied 
a full hearing on the merits and should be given a new trial in 
this regard. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Jury should not have found the plaintiff 50% negligent 
with regard to the failure to file financing statements over the 
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass. 
Utah's Comparative Negligence statute, UCA 78-27-38, states 
as follows: "The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However no 
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount 
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant." 
Where the defense rests on contributory negligence, the 
attorney has the burden of proving every element of such 
contributory negligence. Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P2d 1238; R. 
Mallen and V. Levit, Legal Malpratice 416, (2nd Ed. 1981). 
The courts have usually refused to impose upon the client 
the duty of supervising the very subject matter of the retention. 
Legal Malpractice, Section 172, p. 222. 
It has been held that the failure to observe statutory 
requirements in the preparation of a security document, the 
failure to record it in the proper county, the failure to record 
it a all, or the failure to inform the client of the necessity 
for recordation constitute acts of negligence sufficient to hold 
an attorney liable to his client, if the negligence can be proved 
and damages shown to be the result of such acts or omissions. 
Theobald v. Byers, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864; 87 ALR 2nd 991. 
Such omissions by the attorney have been found to be 
negligence as a matter of law. Practical Offset v. Davis, 404 
N.E.2d 516; Degen v. Steinbeck, 142 N.E2d 328; George v. Caton, 
600 P2d 822; Kane, Kane & Kritzer v. Altager, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534. 
In the Utah case, Acculog, Inc. v. Keith Peterson, 692 P2d 
728, the Supreme Court discussed the elements of comparative 
negligence, and the Court stated: "The ultimate facts in a 
comparative negligence case embrace only negligence, causation 
and the percentages of negligence attributed to the plaintiff and 
defendant. (Citations omitted). A plaintiff cannot be held to be 
contributorily negligent unless his negligence is causally 
connected to the plaintiff's injury." 
In Acculog the Court explains, a page 730, that: "We are 
not concerned in comparative negligence law with the cause of the 
damages, but with the cause of the injury instead. 
"The term injury is sometimes used in the sense of damage, 
as including the type of harm or loss for which compensation is 
sought and has been defined as damage resulting from an unlawful 
act; but in strict legal significance, there is, properly 
speaking, a material distinction between the two terms, in that 
injury means something done against the right of the party, 
producing damage, whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss 
sustained by reason of the injury." 
In that case, the Court determined that the cause of a truck 
fire was the injury and the loss to the truck and its contents 
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was the damage. And that/ although the jury had found that the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent/ the Court set aside the 
verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence that the 
plaintiff had in any way caused the truck fire. 
So it is in the case now before the Court. The plaintiff 
did nothing to prevent or hinder the attorney from filing the 
financing statements to perfect its secured interests in the 
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass. The evidence is 
uncontroverted that the attorneys were aware of the need to file 
the financing statements; that the plaintiff was not aware of 
such a need; that the plaintiff was relying upon the security for 
the payment of the deferred purchase price; that the attorneys 
did not advise the plaintiff of the need to file the statements; 
and that/ in fact/ no statements were ever filed. 
Therefore, there being no evidence that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in the failure to file the financing 
statements, the jury verdict in that regard should be set aside. 
II. 
The defense did not put on any evidence to reduce or 
mi t iga te the damages al leged by the p l a i n t i f f . 
I t i s uncontradic ted in the record tha t during the period 
between September 1984 and February 1985/ while United f ibe rg lass 
was in d e f a u l t / t h e a c c o u n t s r e c e i v a b l e over which t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s s e c u r i t y would have a p p l i e d was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
$190/000.00 to $240/000.00. 
I t i s evident from the d i s p a r i t y between the s t a t e of the 
evidence and the finding of the jury that the jury's decision in 
assessing damages was prejudiced by its assessment of liability. 
Therefore, the finding limiting the plaintiff to $84,000.00 
in damages should be set aside also. 
III. 
The trial court excluded the affidavit of R. Bailie and 
evidence of his conversations with the plaintiff after his 
deposition. 
At trial the defense relied upon both the oral and 
deposition testimony of R. Bailie as evidence that the plaintiff 
knew that its rights under paragraph 6.03 were subject to the 
lien of Sovran Bank (RT. Vol. 5 of 6 days, pages 50-51 and 63-
64) . 
Subsequent to the deposition and prior to trial, R. Bailie 
had given an affidavit to the plaintiff further explaining his 
testimony which supported the plaintiff's position that it did 
not know that its rights under 6.03 were subject to the liens of 
the bank. However, when the plaintiff attempted to introduce 
such testimony and affidavit the Court excluded it. This was 
error. 
Rule 613, Utah Rules of Evidence, permits the use of such 
testimony and affidavits as long as the witness has the 
opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposing 
party has the opportunity to cross examine the witness. 
Mr. Bailie was present at trial; he would have been able to 
explain or deny the statements; and he was subject to the 
examination of the defense counsel. Therefore, his statements 
should have been admitted. 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, states in pertinent part 
that: "Error may not predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right is affected, and 
(1) ... 
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the 
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the 
question was asked." 
The defense relied principally upon two witnesses for its 
defense that the plaintiff had notice of its rights under 6.03. 
One of those witnesses was Mr. Bailie and the other was Dwight 
Williams. Since Mr. Bailie was a disinterested witness, the 
exclusion of his testimony favorable to the plaintiff was 
prejudice, and the jury's finding that the plaintiff had been 
advised of his rights under 6.03 should be set aside. 
IV. 
An essential element of the plaintiff's case was its burden 
to show how it would have benefited had it known its rights under 
paragraph 6.03. 
Where the error is an omission, the test of causation is: 
had the attorney performed the act, would the plaintiff have 
benefited. Dunn v. Mckay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 p2d. 
894, 895 (Utah 1978); Legal Malpractice, Section 102. 
During the course of the trial, when the plaintiff attempted 
to show how the agreement could have been changed had it known 
that its rights under 6.03 were subject to the lien of Sovran 
Bank, the Court sustained the objection of the defense, thus 
precluding the plaintiff from a full and fair hearing on the 
merits of its claim. 
The court's exclusion of evidence of what the plaintiff 
could have done had it known the true nature of its rights under 
paragraph 6.03 was prejudicial in that the plaintiff was 
precluded from presenting a full and complete case. 
Therefore, the verdict in this regard should be set aside 
and the matter remanded for an new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the jury verdict finding the 
plaintiff 50% negligent was not supported by the evidence and was 
improper as a matter of law and should be set aside and new trial 
ordered. 
The jury's reduction of the damages from that shown by the 
evidence was arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside and 
a new trial ordered. 
The Courts exlcusion of evidence regarding how the plaintiff 
would have modified the agreement had it known that its rights 
under paragraph 6.03 were subject to the liens of Sovran Bank was 
prejudicial error, and the verdict in that regard should be set 
aside and a new trial ordered on that issue. 
Further, the Courts exlcusion of the testimony of the R. 
Bailie and his affidavit given to the plaintiff subsequent to his 
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deposition was prejudicial to the plaintiff's case entitling the 
plaintiff to an new trial. 
Dated: July 5, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Joseph R. Fox 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
